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Summary
The problem of estimating cosmological parameters such as Ω from
noisy or incomplete data is an example of an inverse problem and, as
such, generally requires a probablistic approach. We adopt the Bayesian
interpretation of probability for such problems and stress the connection
between probability and information which this approach makes explicit.
This connection is important even when information is “minimal” or, in
other words, when we need to argue from a state of maximum ignorance.
We use the transformation group method of Jaynes to assign minimally–
informative prior probability measure for cosmological parameters in the
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simple example of a dust Friedman model, showing that the usual state-
ments of the cosmological flatness problem are based on an inappropriate
choice of prior. We further demonstrate that, in the framework of a clas-
sical cosmological model, there is no flatness problem.
In the physical sciences, the word “model” is usually used to denote a theo-
retical description of a system that contains one or more “free parameters” whose
values can not be determined a priori but which have to be estimated by empirical
means. Such estimation problems generally go under the name of “inverse prob-
lems” and, because available data are often incomplete or noisy, they generally
require probabilistic reasoning.
Modern ‘Big Bang’ cosmology rests on a mathematical framework supplied
by the simplest relativistic cosmological models compatible with the Cosmological
Principle, i.e. the Friedman models. These models have two free parameters, the
Hubble parameter, H0, and the deceleration parameter q0 (or, equivalently for these
models, the deceleration parameter q0 = Ω0/2; the suffix “0” indicates that the pa-
rameter in question is measured at the present epoch, i.e. when the cosmological
proper time is t0.) As is the case for physical models in general, these parameters
are not predicted by the Big Bang theory itself, but need to be inferred from obser-
vational data. Because the values of H and Ω at any time can be determined from
the present values H0 and Ω0 if the model is specified, it is in principle possible
to learn about conditions very near the Big Bang singularity from estimates of the
cosmological parameters made at the present time.
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The problem with Ω is that its value is not known with any precision: it
probably lies in the range 0.10 < Ω0 < 1.5, but the relevant evidence is often
contradictory1. However, Ω evolves strongly with cosmic time t in such a way that
Ω = 1 is an unstable fixed point. To get a value of Ω anywhere near unity at the
present time (even a factor of a few either way) consequently requires a value at very
early times extremely close to unity (say Ω = 1 ± 10−60 at the Planck time). The
cosmological flatness problem arises from the judgement that this “fine–tuning”
is somehow unlikely on the basis of standard Friedman models; it is is usually
“resolved” by appealing to some transient mechanism (e.g. inflation2) which can
make Ω evolve towards unity for some time, rather than away from it.
But do we have any right to claim that some values of Ω are more likely than
others? Can one make any inferences at all from the uncertain parameter estimates
we have in cosmology? And what precisely does it mean to say that Ω is “close to
unity” anyway?
To answer these questions we need to understand the role of probability in the
solution of inverse problems generally3. We adopt the objective Bayesian interpre-
tation of probability which, we believe, is the only way to formulate this type of
reasoning in a fully self– consistent way. In this interpretation, probability rep-
resents a generalisation of the notions of “true” and “false” to intermediate cases
where there is insufficient information to decide with logical certainty between these
two alternatives4. Unlike the opposing “frequentist” view, the Bayesian lends itself
naturally to the interpretation of unique events, of which the Big Bang is the most
obvious relevant example5.
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The central principle involved in Bayesian inference is Bayes’ theorem6. Sup-
pose Hi represents one of a set of hypotheses (or models), D is some data and I
is whatever relevant prior information we may have (or which we assume to be the
case) before obtaining the data D. Bayes’ theorem states that
P (Hi|DI) =
P (Hi|I)P (D|HiI)∑
i P (Hi|I)P (D|HiI)
, (1)
where P (Hi|I) is called the prior probability of Hi given our prior information,
P (D|HiI) is the likelihood and P (Hi|DI) is the posterior probability. Notice that
all probabilities here are conditional on the information I which is either known
or assumed to be true in a given model. If the prior is relatively flat and the like-
lihood of the data D is strongly peaked for a particular Hi then our inference of
the posterior probability is strongly determined by the data. If, on the other hand,
the data discriminate only weakly between the models then the posterior is domi-
nated by the prior. In general, however, both prior and likelihood are required for
the inverse problem to be well–posed. Many critics have dubbed the Bayesian ap-
proach “subjective” because different individuals may possess different information
and therefore assign different priors to the same hypothesis. This is not a serious
objection: your assessment of the probability that a given horse will win a race must
change if you learn the other horses have all been drugged! What is important is
that, given the same information, the same prior should be assigned. We therefore
need an objective set of rules for assigning priors when information is specified. In
particular, we may have no information at all other than that inherent in the model
we adopt. What should one do when one has such minimal information about a
system?
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Even this apparently simple question turns out to be extremely deep and there
is no universally accepted principle for assigning minimally–informative priors in
general circumstances. Jaynes7 has described one approach which is, as far as we
are aware, the most general objective algorithm available. “Jaynes’ principle” is that
one looks for a measure on the parameter space of the system that possesses the
property of invariance under the group of transformations which leave unchanged
the mathematical form of the physical laws describing the system. In the absence
of any other constraints, the principle of maximum information entropy (a principle
of least prejudice) yields a prior probability simply proportional to this measure.
To take a trivial illustrative example, consider the problem of estimating the
position of a particle on the real line. Our state of knowledge, if no signposts are vis-
ible, must be unchanged if we shift our coordinates by any distance γ. This requires
µ(x) = µ(x + γ), a functional equation which has only one solution: µ =constant.
This is in full accord with our intuition, but it does not mean that a uniform prior
is appropriate for all cases where we are seeking to encode minimal information.
For example, Evrard8 has calculated the least–informative prior for a free particle
in velocity space using Jaynes’ principle and the laws of special relativity. Even in
this simple example, the result is non–trivial: “least information prior” does not
necessarily mean “no prior”.
We now turn to the appropriate minimally informative prior for the cosmo-
logical parameters H0 and Ω0. We take the laws of physics to be the Friedman
equations describing a pressureless perfect fluid in the form
a
(
k +
a˙2
c2
)
= χ, (2)
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where χ remains constant throughout the evolution of the system; its value is de-
termined by the “initial value equation”
χ =
4πGρa3
3c2
. (3)
The quantity χ can be thought of as an absolute scale parameter. In equations (2)
& (3), a is the cosmic scale factor (another scale parameter) and ρ is the matter
density. The quantity k appearing in equation (2) is the curvature of spatial sections
in the model, scaled to take the values 0 if Ω = 1, −1 if Ω < 1 or +1 if Ω0 > 1.
The system can be parametrised completely in terms of χ and a. (In fact, we
could equally well have chosen to work with redshift z, cosmological proper time t,
conformal time τ , temperature T , or anything else monotonically related to a: the
resulting measure would turn out to be the same, but the equations turn out to be
simpler in terms of a itself.) We now need to express the cosmological parameters
H = a˙/a and Ω = 2q = −2aa¨/a˙2 in terms of a and χ. We obtain, for k = ±1,
Ω = 2(2∓ a/χ)−1 (4)
and
H =
( c
χ
)√2∓ a/χ
(a/χ)3/2
. (5)
Remember that the suffix 0 represents a quantity defined at the present epoch, so
H0 and Ω0 are the values of these parameters when a = a0; χ = χ0 at all epochs.
Because both χ and a are scale parameters, we look for a measure which is invariant
under the transformations a′ = αa and χ′ = βχ, where α and β are constants. Such
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invariances require that the information represented by our measure does not change
if we use a different ruler to measure distances. It follows that
µ(χ, a) ∝
1
χa
, (6)
which becomes, after substituting from equations (4) & (5),
µ(H,Ω) ∝
1
HΩ|Ω− 1|
. (7).
Note that this measure leads to an improper (i.e. non–normalisable) prior proba-
bility. This can be rectified by bringing in additional information, such as the ages
of cosmic objects which rule out high values of both Ω and H. Anthropic selection
effects can also be brought to bear on this question5. The measure for H is uni-
form in the logarithm, as one might expect from the Bayesian “rule of thumb” for
scale parameters9. The measure in Ω is, however, more complicated than this. In
particular, it diverges at Ω = 0 and Ω = 1, the former corresponding to an empty
Universe without deceleration and the latter to the critical-density Einstein–De Sit-
ter model. These singularities could have been anticipated because these are two
fixed points in the evolution of Ω. A model with Ω = 1 exactly remains in that
state forever. Models with Ω < 1 evolve to a state of free expansion with Ω = q = 0.
Since states with 0 < Ω < 1 are transitory, it is reasonable, in the absence of any
other information, to infer that the system should be in one of the two fixed states.
(All values of Ω > 1 are transitory.)
The measure (7) also demonstrates how dangerous it is to talk about Ω0 “near”
unity. In terms of our least–informative measure, values of Ω not exactly equal to 1
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are actually infinitely far from this value. A similar property is held by the velocity–
space measure8, which demonstrates the velocities of all material particles are, in a
well–defined sense, infinitely far from c.
We now turn to the flatness problem. The usual argument is essentially that,
without inflation, the models that produce Ω0 = 1± ǫ at the present epoch emerge
from earlier states with Ω even closer to unity. If one were to adopt a measure
which is roughly flat in the vicinity of Ω = 1 as t → 0 then the probability as-
sociated with this set of states would vanish and there would indeed be a flatness
problem: it would appear “unlikely” that our Universe was correctly modelled by
the standard Friedman equations and one would be pushed into accepting inflation
as a solution of this “fine–tuning”. But our measure (7) demonstrates that the
assumption of a constant prior for Ω is not consistent with the assumption of min-
imal information. It therefore represents a considerable prejudice compared to the
least—informative and, therefore, least–prejudiced measure. This prejudice may
be motivated to some extent by quantum–gravitational considerations that render
the classical model inappropriate, but unless the model adopted and its associated
information are stated explicitly one has no right to assign a prior and therefore no
right to make any inferences.
Notwithstanding the recent research interest in quantum gravity, we feel that
‘minimal knowledge’ is a fair description of our state of understanding of physics
at the Planck epoch. In terms of the least–informative measure, the probability
associated with smaller and smaller intervals of Ω (around unity) at earlier and
earlier times need not become arbitrarily small because of the singularity at Ω = 1.
8
Indeed, this measure is constructed in precisely such a way that the probability
associated with a given range of Ω0 is preserved as the system evolves. We should
not therefore be surprised to find Ω0 ≃ 1 at the present epoch even in the absence
of inflation, so we do not need inflation to “explain” this value. In this sense, there
is no flatness problem in a purely classical cosmological model.
We realise that many of the issues we have discussed remain controversial.
We accept, for example, that Jaynes’ principle may be the last word in the theory
of prior assignment based on minimal information. Nevertheless, inferences based
only on vague prescriptions of uniform priors have no place in physics or cosmol-
ogy. Consistent inverse reasoning requires the assignment of a prior according to
some objective rules; failure to do this replaces bona fide inductive logic with mere
superstition.
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